In encryption schemes, the sender may not generate randomness properly if generating randomness is costly, and the sender is not concerned about the security of a message. The problem was studied by the first author (2016), and was formalized in a game-theoretic framework. In this work, we construct an encryption scheme with an optimal round complexity on the basis of the mechanism of repeated games.
Introduction
Randomness is essential for many cryptographic primitives. In practice, generating randomness is a complex and difficult task. There are many cryptographic failures [1] - [8] .
Even though users can access to a good randomness source, they may not use it if generating randomness itself is a costly task. Such a situation arises naturally for energysaving devices. In encryption schemes, the sender may not generate randomness properly if she is not concerned about the security of a message to be encrypted. Namely, the sender may rationally decide not to generate costly randomness.
The problem of such rationality was studied in [9] for public-key encryption schemes. For the first step to understand the behavior of such rational parties, the author considered a simple setting in which rational senders and receivers can choose either good randomness and bad randomness. Good one is a truly random string, but is costly. Bad one is a fixed string, e.g., the all-zero string, and can be generated without cost. The author gave both positive and negative results. The study reveals the importance of the information given to the sender and the receiver. Secure encryption schemes were provided depending on situations. For the most basic situation, in which the receiver does not know whether a message to be sent is valuable to him or not, a two-round scheme is constructed based on any secure public-key encryption scheme. In a more difficult situation, in which the receiver may know the value of a message to him, the two-round scheme is not secure. Then, the author presented a three-round scheme with a peculiar final step, where the receiver encrypts a recovered message with the Manuscript received September 11, 2017. Manuscript revised December 1, 2017. † The author is with the Institute of Science and Engineering, Kanazawa University, Kanazawa-shi, 920-1192 Japan. † † The author was a student at Kanazawa University, Kanazawashi, 920-1192 Japan.
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This Work
We study the problem of rational behavior for generating randomness in encryption by treating the security game as a repeated game. In public-key encryption schemes, after generating a pair of public and secret keys, messages are assumed to be encrypted repeatedly. Thus, it is natural to formalize the security game of encryption schemes as a repeated game. We present a round-efficient scheme based on a mechanism of repeated games. Specifically, we construct a secure two-round scheme in the setting for which a three-round scheme was presented in [9] . The scheme is the first two-round scheme in the setting where the receiver may know the value of a message to be sent. Since non-interactive schemes cannot be secure [9] , the scheme achieves the optimal round complexity.
Our Model
Our security model is based on the study of [9] . We define a variant of chosen plaintext attack (CPA) game of encryption schemes. The game consists of the key generation phase, which is conducted only once, and the encryption phase, which is played repeatedly. In the encryption phase, an adversary, on input public keys, chooses two challenge messages, and, given a ciphertext, tries to guess which of the two messages was encrypted. The sender and the receiver are rational players, and have their own utility functions. The values of utilities are determined by the outcome of the game. Each rational player needs to choose either good or bad randomness before performing probabilistic algorithms. Roughly speaking, an encryption scheme is said to be secure if the prescribed strategy for rational players is a Nash equilibrium, and a message is securely encrypted in every encryption phase when rational players follow the prescribed strategy.
In this work, we model the above repeated game as an infinitely repeated game. More concretely, we consider an infinite sequence of adversaries A 1 , A 2 , . . . such that A i plays only at the i-th encryption phase, called a stage game. The ith stage game is conducted between the sender, the receiver, and A i . Since A i cannot communicate with other adversaries, we can avoid the problem of using computationallysecure primitives an exponential number of times. Although the message security is considered for every stage game, ra-tional players are assumed to calculate their utilities as a total of infinitely-many stage games. Thus, we can utilize a mechanism of infinitely repeated games in the framework of CPA games of encryption schemes.
Related Work
There are many studies using game-theoretic analysis for cryptographic primitives, including secret sharing [10] - [19] , two-party protocols [20] - [22] , public-key encryption [9] , leader election [23] , [24] , Byzantine agreement [25] , delegation of computation [26] - [30] , and protocol design [31] , [32] . Among them, repeated games have been introduced only in rational secret sharing [33] . This work shows that the mechanism of repeated games is effective for reducing the round complexity of encryption schemes.
Halpern and Pass [34] introduced the framework of machine games for incorporating the cost of computation, including the cost of randomization, in utility functions. They showed that if randomization is free, there always exists a Nash equilibrium in machine games. In this work, we employ a simpler framework specific to encryption schemes, and show that a Nash equilibrium strategy satisfies CPA security.
Halpern et al. [35] , [36] used cryptographic primitives for finding equilibria in repeated games played by computationally-bounded players.
Halpin and Naor [37] proposed a method for generating randomness by human game play.
Notations
A function ε(·) is called negligible if for any constant c, ε(λ) < 1/λ c for every sufficiently large λ ∈ N. For two families of random variable X = {X n } n∈N and Y = {Y n } n∈N , we say X and Y are computationally indistinguishable, denoted by X ≈ c Y, if for every probabilistic polynomial-time distinguisher D, there is a negligible function ε(·) such that | Pr[D(X n ) = 1] − Pr[D(Y n ) = 1]| ≤ ε(n) for every sufficiently large n. For a probabilistic algorithm A, we denote by A(x; r) the output of A running on input x with randomness r.
Repeated Games for Public-Key Encryption
We assume that both the sender and the receiver are rational players. Each player has a set of valuable messages, and prefers a message to be sent confidentially if it is valuable to the player. We consider the cost of generating randomness for algorithms. Each player can choose one of the two types of randomness, good randomness and bad randomness. The former is a truly random string but costly to generate. The latter is the all-zero string and can be generated without cost.
We model the interactions between the sender and the receiver as a game. The game is a variant of the chosen plaintext attack (CPA) game of encryption schemes. First, the key generation phase is conducted by the sender and the receiver individually. Then, the guessing game is conducted between the sender, the receiver, and an adversary. The adversary chooses two messages m 0 and m 1 . A randomly chosen message is encrypted by the interaction between the sender and the receiver. Given the transcript of the interaction, the adversary tries to guess which message was encrypted. The guessing game is played repeatedly. We assume that the repeated game is perfect monitoring, in the sense that the players can observe each other's actions after each guessing game ends. Let M S and M R be the sets of valuable messages for the sender and the receiver, respectively. In each guessing game, the adversary chooses two messages so that both of them are in either
We assume that p S , p R , p S R are a priori fixed, and the same values are used in each iterated game.
As observed in [9] , it is necessary to define a public-key encryption scheme as an interactive protocol in which both the sender and the receiver can generate their own public and secret keys. (pk S , pk R , sk S , m), st R = (pk S , pk R , sk R ), and c 0 = ⊥. Let w ∈ {S , R} be the first sender, andw ∈ {S , R} \ {w} the second sender. For each round j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, when j is odd, Enc j (c j−1 , st w ) outputs (c j , st w ), and st w is updated to st w , and when j is even, Enc j (c j−1 , stw) outputs (c j , st w ), and stw is updated to st w . We define a formal security game for rational sender and receiver in repeated games. Without loss of generality, we assume that every probabilistic algorithm requires random bits of length equal to the security parameter † , and that, in the encryption phase, only the first algorithm for each party is probabilistic.
Definition 2 (Repeated CPA game for rational parties). Let Π = ({Gen w } w∈{S ,R} , {Enc j } j∈{1,...,n} , Dec) be an nround public-key encryption scheme. For a sequence of adversaries A = (A 1 , A 2 , . . . ), the security parameter λ, valuable message spaces M S and M R , and a pair of strategies (σ S , σ R ), we define the following game
• Key generation phase: • Challenge phase: For i = 1, 2, . . . , do the following.
-Challenge generation: Given (pk S , pk R ),
1} represent the choices of A i for the auxiliary inputs to the sender and the receiver, and st A is the state information of A i . Then, b ∈ {0, 1} is chosen uniformly at random. 
where Adv i = 2|E[Win i ]− 1/2| and the probability is taken over the key generation phase and the i-th challenge phase.
In the above game, the adversary can choose whether † In general, message spaces should be dependent on the public key. This can be realized by defining an embedding function Emb(·) for valuable message spaces M w and denoting by Emb pk (M w ) the valuable message space corresponding to M w under the public key pk. Then, the adversary chooses messages from Emb pk (M S ) ∪ Emb pk (M R ). For simplicity, we use M S and M R instead.
the sender (and the receiver) can know the value of a message for the other player, namely Val i R (and Val i S ), before interacting with the other player. This setting is challenging as observed in [9] .
Note that the adversary A i plays the CPA game only at the i-th stage game, and does not communicate with other adversaries. Thus, it is possible to achieve a negligible advantage for every stage game although we define the whole CPA game as an infinitely-repeated game.
We assume that strategies (σ S , σ R ) are chosen from the set of all probabilistic algorithms. Thus, they are not necessarily polynomial-time computable.
Next, we define the utility functions in the repeated CPA game. In repeated games, the discount factor δ > 0 is employed so that the utility of the i-th stage game is discounted by the factor δ i−1 . We assume that rational players calculate their utilities as if the stage games will be played infinitely.
Definition 3. Let (σ S , σ R ) be a pair of strategies of the game Game rep . For a discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1), the utility of player w ∈ {S , R} when the outcome Out = (Num gen S , Num gen
where u w [i] is the utility of player w in the i-th stage game, defined by
and c rand w , u sec w ∈ R represent the cost of generating randomness and the utility when the message is sent securely, respectively, and Adv i is equal to Adv i except that Adv i = 0
if Adv i is a negligible function in λ. We assume that u sec w > c rand w > 0, which implies that the security is worth paying the cost of generating randomness.
The utility when the players follow a pair of strategies
where Out is the outcome of the game Game rep (Π, λ, A, M S , M R , σ S , σ R ), and the minimum is taken over all sequences of probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries A = (A 1 , A 2 , . . . ) and valuable message spaces M S and M R . We assume that the parameters δ, c rand w , u sec w are independent of the security parameter λ † † . Since Out is a function of λ, U w (σ S , σ R ) is a function of λ.
A round version Adv i of Adv i is introduced for the simplicity of arguments. In addition, we assume that rational † † In our analysis, the assumption is not essential. Indeed, the main theorem (Theorem 1) holds as long as the condition in the theorem is satisfied.
players are not concerned about a negligible advantage of their utility.
Definition 4 (Nash equilibrium). A pair of strategies (σ S , σ R ) is called a Nash equilibrium if for every w ∈ {S , R} and strategy σ w , it holds that
We define the security of encryption schemes for rational players. For an encryption scheme Π and a pair of strategies (σ S , σ R ), we require that (1) when the players follow (σ S , σ R ), Π is secure in every stage game, and (2) the strategy of following (σ S , σ R ) is a Nash equilibrium. 
Two-Round Scheme
We propose a two-round scheme that achieves a CPA security with a Nash equilibrium. The scheme can be based on any usual CPA-secure encryption scheme. In the key generation phase, both the sender and the receiver generate their own public key and secret key. In the encryption phase, a key agreement protocol is conducted to share a key. The shared key has the property such that it is a uniformly random string if and only if both players use good randomness in the encryption phase.
The above two-round scheme is not secure in a oneshot game, since if a message to be sent is valuable only to the receiver, the sender never uses good randomness. We overcome the insecurity in a one-shot game by a mechanism of infinitely-repeated games. In repeated games, each player can choose an action depending on the actions in the previous stage games. We employ a grim trigger strategy as a punishment strategy in repeated games. Initially, players choose good randomness in the encryption phase regardless of the value of a message to be sent. In any stage game, if some player chooses bad randomness, then bad randomness will be chosen in every subsequent game. This strategy is effective when valuable messages to each player will be chosen with at least a certain probability. The mechanism is similar to the repeated prisoners' dilemma.
We present a formal description of our two-round scheme Π two = ({Gen w } w∈{S ,R} , {Enc 1 , Enc 2 }, Dec) and the grim trigger strategy for the repeated CPA game. The scheme is based on a public-key encryption scheme Π = (Gen, Enc, Dec). The message space is {0, 1} 2λ , where λ is the security parameter.
• Gen w (1 λ ) : Generate (pk w , sk w ) ← Gen(1 λ ), and output (pk w , sk w ). The state information is set to be st 1 w = (pk w , pkw, sk w ), wherew ∈ {S , R} \ {w}. • Enc 1 (st 1 R ): Sample r 1 ∈ {0, 1} λ uniformly at random, compute c 1 ← Enc(pk S , r 1 ), and output (c 1 , st 2 R ), where st 2 R = (st 1 R , r 1 ). Enc 2 (m, c 1 , st 1 S ): Sample r 2 ∈ {0, 1} λ uniformly at random and compute c 2 ← Enc(pk R , r 2 ) andr 1 ← Dec(sk S , c 1 ). Then, set r =r 1 • r 2 , compute c 3 ← m⊕r, and output (c 2 , c 3 ), where • denote the concatenation operation.
• Dec(c 2 , c 3 , st 2 R ): Computer 2 ← Dec(sk R , c 2 ) andr = r 1 •r 2 . Then outputm = c 3 ⊕r.
The above scheme Π two is similar to the three-round scheme presented in [9] . In the scheme, a shared key in the encryption phase has a property such that it is a uniformlyrandom string if one of the sender and the receiver uses good randomness. This scheme is not secure without the final step. This is because the sender does not have any incentive to use good randomness in the key generation phase. The sender can achieve their own security only by using good randomness in the encryption phase. To prevent such laziness of the sender, we need the final step in which the receiver encrypts a recovered message using the sender's public key and makes it public. In repeated CPA games, the final step is not needed since a punishment can be imposed in subsequent stage games.
The grim trigger strategy (σ tri S , σ tri R ) for repeated CPA games is defined as follows.
• For each w ∈ {S , R}, σ tri w (M w ) outputs (a gen w , st w ) = (Good, Good). Recall that p S , p R , p S R denote the probabilities that chosen messages in repeated CPA games are in M S \ M R , M R \ M S , and M S ∩ M R , respectively. We show that the scheme Π two is secure under the trigger strategy if valuable messages to each player will be chosen in stage games with at least a certain probability. First, we show that there is a negligible function ε(·) such that Adv i ≤ ε(λ) for every i in Game rep (Π two , λ, A, M S , M R , σ tri S , σ tri R ). Since the players follow (σ tri S , σ tri R ), they choose good randomness at the key generation phase and every encryption phase. For the i-th stage game, suppose A i chooses m 0 , m 1 as a pair of challenge messages. The view of A i is {pk S , pk R , m 0 , m 1 , Enc(pk S , r 1 ), Enc(pk R , r 2 ), m b ⊕ (r 1 • r 2 )} ≈ c {pk S , pk R , m 0 , m 1 , Enc(pk S , r 1 ), Enc(pk R , r 2 ), m b ⊕ (r 1 • r 2 )} = {pk S , pk R , m 0 , m 1 , Enc(pk S , r 1 ), Enc(pk R , r 2 ), r} = {pk S , pk R , m 0 , m 1 , Enc(pk S , r 1 ), Enc(pk R , r 2 ),
where r 1 , r 2 , r 1 , r 2 ∈ {0, 1} λ and r ∈ {0, 1} 2λ are uniformly random strings. We have used the CPA security of the underlying scheme Π for the relation ≈ c . Thus, for every i ∈ N, there is a negligible function ε i (·) such that Adv i ≤ ε i (λ).
Since i is countable, there is a negligible function ε(·) such that Adv i ≤ ε(λ) for every i and every sufficiently large λ [38] . Next, we show that the pair of strategies (σ tri S , σ tri R ) is a Nash equilibrium. It follows from the above security analysis that
Let consider the case that player w ∈ {S , R} chooses Bad in the key generation phase. Suppose S chose Bad in the key generation phase. (The same argument can be applied to the case for R.) An adversary A i can obtain r 1 by decrypting Enc(pk S , r 1 ) by using sk S , which is a part of the output of Gen(1 λ ; 0 λ ). Thus A i can win every stage game by choosing m 0 , m 1 such that the first halves of m 0 and m 1 are different, and, on receiving c 3 , outputting b = 0 if the first half of c 3 ⊕ (r 1 • 0 λ ) is equal to that of m 0 , and b = 1 otherwise. Since the advantage Adv i will be 1 for every i, the utility U S will be at most
which is less than (1) since p S + p S R > (2 − δ)(c rand S /u sec S ). Thus, each player cannot increase the utility by choosing Bad in the key generation phase.
In the following, we consider players who choose Good in the key generation phase, but may choose Bad in the encryption phase. In the analysis, we use the following three values for the utility u w [i] of the i-th stage game:
• u 1 = 0, which is the case that Val i w = 0 and Num i w = 0; • u 2 = −c rand w , which is the case that Val i w = 0, Num i w = 1 or that Adv i = 0, Val i w = 1, Num i w = 1;
• u 3 = −u sec w , which is the case that Adv i = 1, Val i w = 1, and Num i w = 0. Note that u 1 > u 2 > u 3 .
Suppose that player R follows σ tri R , and player S chooses Good for stages i = 1, . . . , r − 1, but chooses Bad at the r-th stage game. Then, the utility u S [i] for the i-th stage game is u 2 for i = 1, . . . , r − 1 since both players chooses Good, and thus Adv i = 0. At the r-the stage, since player S chooses Bad, u S [r] is at most u 1 . After the r-th stage, player R uses Bad in every subsequent stage game since R follows σ tri R . Then, an adversary A i can win the i-th stage game for every i > r. Since R uses Bad, r 1 = 0 λ . Thus A i can win the game by choosing m 0 , m 1 such that the first halves of m 0 and m 1 are different, and outputting b = 0 if the first half of c 3 is equal to that of m 0 , and b = 1 otherwise. For such A i 's, u S [i] is u 1 with probability p R , and u 3 with probability p S + p S R . Thus, the utility U S is at most − c rand w + u 2 + δu 2 + · · · + δ r−2 u 2 + δ r−1 u 1
which is less than (1) since p S + p S R > c rand S /(δu sec S ). The same argument holds when player S follows σ tri S , but player R tries to choose Bad in the encryption phase. Thus, both players S and R cannot increase their utility by changing their strategies from (σ tri S , σ tri R ). Hence, (σ tri S , σ tri R ) is a Nash equilibrium, and thus the statement follows.
Conclusions
In this work, we employed repeated games for reducing the round complexity of encryption schemes performed by rational players. Our two-round scheme achieves a Nash equilibrium in the repeated CPA games. However, a Nash equilibrium may not be a satisfying solution concept in repeated games. The notion of a subgame-perfect equilibrium is known as a stronger solution concept in repeated games. Thus, one of the future work is to achieve a subgame-perfect equilibrium in our framework. For the one-shot game, a stronger solution concept, strict Nash equilibrium, was achieved in the previous work [9] . Another future work is to explore the possibility of the mechanism of repeated games for other cryptographic primitives. Since a repeated game models a long-term relationship, the mechanism may be applied to cryptographic protocols by considering a long-term relationship.
